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China have led to different
results for Australia and
New Zealand.
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The closeness of the Trans-Tasman
relationship, from the ANZAC tradition to a
common heritage, has long been
“characterized by shared perceptions on most
issues of mutual concern.” While the United
States remains the ally and security protector
of both Australia and New Zealand, China,
currently, is their top trading partner and they
both enjoy a trade surplus with China. Despite
these commonalities, Australia and New
Zealand have recently recalibrated their policy
toward China — but in different directions
and with different results.
Since the launch of the trade war between
China and the United States in 2018,
Washington has been more vocal about
scrutinizing investment from Huawei and ZTE.
After a meeting among the Five Eyes
intelligence-sharing allies in Gold Coast,
Australia in 2018, both Canberra and
Wellington decided to ban Huawei from
participating in their 5G networks. However,
there was a subtle difference in how they
framed and justified their ban. The Australian
government expressed national security
concerns over China’s telecommunications
investment in Australia. In contrast, New
Zealand framed its choice as a “country-
agnostic” decision, “made by bureaucrats, not
politicians.” Although they made the same
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decision on Huawei and ZTE, Wellington’s
“country-agnostic” framing has so far allowed
its economic relations with China to avoid
being sanctioned.
More recently, Australia took the lead in
calling for an independent, international, and
impartial investigation of the COVID-19
pandemic by the World Health Organization
(WHO) in April 2020. This immediately
received strong backlash from Beijing. The
Chinese ambassador in Canberra hinted that
Chinese consumers (e.g., students and tourists)
might boycott Australia and its agricultural
products. Australian Foreign Minister Marise
Payne repudiated the threat as “economic
coercion.”
Despite having more than 130 countries’
support for an investigation, which was
eventually adopted by the WHO on May 19, the
resolution was a compromise one as a result of
the push-back from Beijing. It did not refer to
China and only asked the WHO to work with
the World Organization for Animal Health and
the Food and Agriculture Organization to
investigate the origin of the outbreak “after
the disease is fully contained.” It might take
years for the pandemic to be “fully contained,”
in light of the outbreak of second wave in
many countries, such as China, South Korea,
and Australia. Also bear in mind that the FAO
is now headed by a Chinese citizen. How far
the investigation can go is a moot point. The
Sino-Australian relationship has deteriorated
rapidly since the Australian initiative.
On the other side of the Tasman Sea, although
New Zealand was one of the 130 countries
calling for setting up an independent inquiry
into COVID-19 and was also backing Taiwan to
join the WHO as an observer, its approach was
more prudent. According to the Washington
Post, “Arden waited until a coalition of dozens
of countries were ready to seek an inquiry
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before backing one, and said New Zealand was
not interested in a ‘witch hunt.’”
In the midst of the pandemic in early June
2020, heads of the foreign ministries of the
Five Eyes countries held a conference to
discuss their common concern over Hong
Kong’s autonomy, alongside the transparency
on COVID-19 and supply chains. Four of them
released a joint statement condemning the
Chinese government for its decision to impose
a new national security law on Hong Kong,
and stating that the new law threatened Hong
Kong’s status as a “bastion of freedom.”
Instead of joining the other four members of
the Five Eyes, New Zealand issued a separate
and yet similar statement, expressing the
country’s “deep concern” about the new
security law as it “erodes Hong Kong’s
autonomy and the system that made it so
prosperous…” This separate statement made
the same point as the joint statement. Why did
the Ardern government not sign the joint
statement but deliver an almost identical
message alone?
The art of the delivery is the key. By voicing its
concern over Hong Kong’s freedom, Ardern
has showed its allies and the world that New
Zealand stands for and treasures the
democratic values of freedom and human
rights. Simultaneously, from the position of
Beijing, this separate statement is perceived as
less confrontational than a collective one;
Wellington thus could “escape” the wrath of its
top trading partner. Australia also acted
earlier than New Zealand in suspending the
extradition treaty with Hong Kong, offering a
“safe haven” for Hong Kong people, and more
significantly issuing a travel advisory to its
citizens, cautioning them against travelling to
Hong Kong. The advisory says explicitly that
“Under the new national security legislation
for Hong Kong, [Australians] could be
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deported or face possible transfer to mainland
China for prosecution under mainland law.”
Alongside these developments, in June 2020,
the Morrison government announced US$186
billion (A$270 billion) in military spending in
the coming 10 years, a 40 percent increase
from its previous budget for 2016-2026. In a
press conference on his “defense reset,”
Morrison emphasized the need for Australia to
prepare for a post-COVID-19 world that is, in
his words, “poorer, more dangerous and more
disorderly.” Although he refrained from
naming China, the media and strategists, e.g.
Peter Jennings of the Australian Strategic
Policy Institute (ASPI), have portrayed the new
defense strategy as aimed at countering the
rise of China. The framing of the current
“defense reset” has pushed Sino-Australian
relations into an even worse situation.
According to China’s Global Times, the Chinese
authorities are considering suing the ASPI for
libel.
The difference between the New Zealand and
Australian approaches to China could be
understood as the difference between hedging
and balancing. Hedging is a risk management
or mitigation policy similar to insurance. In
academic circles, strategic hedging is highly
contested and widely (mis)understood as a
mix of balancing and bandwagoning. While
balancing is driven by the desire to protect the
state from clearly identified and unambiguous
security threats, hedging focuses on risk
management with the objectives of reducing a
potential security risk, lessening the likelihood
that a threat will materialize, and mitigating
harm if potential threats materialize. Hedging
is defined as the policy that sends “ambiguous
signals to competing powers about its possible
future alignment decisions” to reduce a
security risk. In other words, hedging means
“eschewing clear-cut alignment with any great
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power, and in turn creating greater
uncertainty regarding which side the
secondary state would take in the event of a
great power conflict.”
One of the biggest common potential risks that
both Oceanic countries are facing is economic
security or, to be more precise, their economic
dependence on China. A successful hedging
policy should allow them to mitigate the risk
of incurring economic insecurity by sending
“ambiguous signals to competing powers about
… possible future alignment decisions to
reduce a security risk.” For example, Canberra
should paint the “defense reset” as not purely
due to China when it, in fact and more
importantly, serves as a response to Trump’s
erratic policy toward U.S. allies and prepares
for a “less reliable and less resolute”
Washington in defending Australia’s interests
in the region. The Australian government
should carefully frame the issue without
showing that it is aligned with the United
States against China.
A small country with a population of 4.8
million only, New Zealand has been sending
ambiguous signals to both China and the
United States. As a Western liberal democratic
country, it vouches for liberal values and
norms, but it simultaneously eschews framing
itself or being seen as the so-called “deputy
sheriff” of the United States in the Asia-Pacific.
By comparison, Australia is more proactive in
bringing about or taking part in a coalition of
“like-minded” countries to balance against
China. This Australian approach has aroused
the ire of China and now Australia is bearing
the brunt of Chinese economic reprisals.
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